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Lorena Sosa, Intersectionality in the Human Rights Legal Framework on Violence against Women: 
At the Centre or the Margins? (CUP 2017) 
 
This book is about international human rights norms with respect to violence against women. 
It is specifically concerned with finding norms relating to intersectionality to understand how 
vast or sparse is the protection against gender-based violence suffered not merely because of 
gender, but also because of race, colour, ethnicity, religion, region, class, disability, sexual 
orientation etc. The book engages with this aim via three courses—first, setting out the 
theoretical and practical implications of intersectionality for violence against women; secondly, 
gauging how far these are incorporated in international human rights law; and finally, analysing 
case studies of intersectional gender violence.  
 
Sosa opens the book with a fitting thought: that violence against women in international law 
has primarily been understood in terms of gender. She shows, rightly so, that the category of 
‘gender’ has become increasingly problematic in that it embodies very specific understandings, 
including rigid boundaries between biological categories of male-female and a 
heteronormative character of patriarchy. Intersectionality, on the other hand, throws the 
diversity of experiences of gender-based violence in sharp relief. It fundamentally questions 
the idea that gender-based violence can be understood regardless of differences based on 
race, religion, caste, class, sexual orientation, disability etc. Sosa points to the increasing 
recognition of this idea in international human rights law in the last few decades. When such 
is the case, it becomes important to understand what the idea or intersectionality is or what it 
does. Sosa offers this account in chapter 2 which aims to serve as the theoretical guide for the 
legal analysis in the rest of the book. Essentially, she points to the overarching idea that while 
discrimination may not be fully captured by a single ground, intersectionality may help 
appreciate interlocking systems of disadvantage. She supplements this idea with three 
propositions: that intersectionality highlights the socio-structural nature of inequality; that it is 
structural rather that individual; and that it creates new and different forms of discrimination. 
These are further supplemented by a number of principles: that identity-categories in 
intersectionality are diverse from within; that these are constantly changing or dynamic; and 
that there is no necessary hierarchy between them. While each of these overarching notions, 
propositions and principles are attractive, Sosa does not offer them as either necessary or 
sufficient for a theoretical account of intersectionality. This though is a common complaint 
about intersectionality, especially its restatements, that it lacks a certain analytical depth for 
being characterised as a theory at all, something which Sosa argues it certainly is. While I too 
would readily agree that intersectionality meets the standard of a coherent theory, more is 
required to be able to actually claim so. Similarly, the justification for the typology of 
intersectionality theories, as divided into group-centered or dynamic-centered, needs to be 
spelled out. It may be that both group-based or systems-based approaches to intersectionality 
are equally plausible, but the natural question that arises is whether all approaches to 
intersectionality can be imagined as one or the other, or if there are approaches which do not 
necessarily fit either. The grounds-based approach of discrimination law, for example, may 
seem to refer to either or both at the same time—referring to certain disadvantaged groups 
or dynamics of disadvantage or both of them at the same time. In fact, Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 
own work seems to do just this, referring to dynamics of oppression while focusing on Black 
women as a group. Sosa’s classification of Crenshaw’s work as mainly categorical and lacking a 
systematic appreciation of the dynamics of disadvantage is thus suspect. A point often missed 
is located in an important footnote in Crenshaw’s 1991 piece which is worth quoting in full: 
 
I consider intersectionality a provisional concept linking contemporary politics with postmodern theory. In 
mapping the intersections of race and gender, the concept does engage dominant assumptions that race 
and gender are essentially separate categories. By tracing the categories to their intersections, I hope to 
suggest a methodology that will ultimately disrupt the tendencies to see race and gender as exclusive or 
separable. While the primary intersections that I explore here are between race and gender, the concept 
can and should be expanded by factoring in issues such as class, sexual orientation, age, and color.1 
 
It is clear that Crenshaw did not intend to limit intersectionality to race and gender or Black 
women for that matter. As a concept and as a methodology, she hoped for it to be much more. 
Choosing Black women as the subject of her analysis for applying the concept and the 
methodology does not quite limit its normative roots. The move in chapter 2 to air the critiques 
of intersectionality theory seems to proceed from a premise which is partial in appreciating 
the provisional nature of the theory it is intending to critique. Here, a disciplinary distinction 
may also be noted. It is not possible to look at works engaging with intersectionality or its 
critiques as necessarily relating to the same cannon or field at all. Crenshaw’s own work, 
especially her 1988 piece, was squarely a critique of discrimination law, through critical race 
feminism, critical legal theory and postmodern theory. Similarly, Ange-Marie Hancock’s 
contributions makes a fine job of historical materials and Patricia Hill Collins and Nira Yuval-
Davis of sociology. Perhaps these positions explain some of the differences in how they 
conceive of intersectionality. One may consider these differences, not as differences in what 
intersectionality is studying—categories or systems—but simply as how it is studying forms of 
disadvantage suffered by people. In that sense, the divisions between intersectionalists seem 
contrived, if only at the level of how ‘the bourgeoning field of intersectionality studies’ is 
organised.2 The discussion in the book plays on these avowed differences without questioning 
their own grounding as differences per se. 
 
At the end of chapter 2, what is more convincing is Sosa’s selection of intersectionality-related 
principles which she applies to violence against women. These suggest that, first, violence 
against women is a result of multiple inequalities; secondly, it is structural; thirdly, it takes place 
in multiple domains, including family, workplace, educational institutions; and finally, women 
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who are located at the intersection of two or more social categories are more vulnerable to 
violence. These principles seem reasonable enough. I am not sure how they flow from the 
specific principles identified earlier in the chapter. But perhaps works on intersectionality do 
not need to cross this bar. They do not all need to identify an irreducible core to 
intersectionality in order to apply some of its principles. Sosa’s work may fall in this category. I 
would thus read the general discussion on intersectionality not as a restatement of the theory 
as theory, but of how the field is organised, including its many different versions, critiques and 
defences. That itself is rather helpful for a project of this kind, which applies intersectionality 
theory to a particular issue at hand, i.e., violence against women in international law.  
 
In chapter 3, Sosa gives a comprehensive overview of the human rights norms attending to the 
issue of violence against women. Here, Sosa gives a roundup of both hard and soft law, 
including a justification for using the latter in responding to gender violence. The discussion 
then moves on to the classification of substantive obligations in respect of gender violence, 
including the distinction between negative and positive obligations, obligations to ‘respect’, 
‘protect’ and ‘fulfil’ rights, and obligations of results or means. There is also an extended 
engagement with state responsibility for acts of private individuals and due diligence 
obligations which arise therein. Sosa makes an important point here: that the call for extending 
due diligence obligations from individual cases to systemic issues does not accord with the idea 
of positive obligations, which is now firmly rooted in human rights law. Nonetheless, due 
diligence as a broad standard applied by courts and other bodies may be ‘instrumental in the 
adoption and assessment of an intersectional approach to [violence against women] in a 
flexible and dynamic manner.’ (p 57) Ultimately, the takeaway from this chapter is the 
appreciation of the sheer breadth of legal norms which exist in international law on violence 
against women. Chapter 4 builds upon another layer of UN norms and chapter 5 further adds 
the legal norms of two more systems, the Council of Europe and the Organisation of American 
States. These chapters show just how dense the legal landscape is. It is also herein and 
especially with respect to CEDAW that references to intersectionality start to shine through. 
Sosa devotes significant space to recounting CEDAW jurisprudence on violence against women, 
especially the General Recommendations of the CEDAW Committee, in outlining the trajectory 
of development of thought on violence against women from no mention of it to full-on 
recognition. The detailing is comprehensive, in respect of different grounds, disadvantaged 
groups, particular rights and nature of obligations in respect of each. One question that arises 
at this point is what the uptake of such proliferation of intersectionality-friendly norms all 
been? In one way, the direct result of it is visible in the way the CEDAW Committee has handled 
individual communications under the Optional Protocol. Sosa considers the intersectional 
awakening in the CEDAW Committee decisions but does not quite address the point squarely 
as to the analytical difference in reasoning which is embedded in intersectionality and 
otherwise. Recent decisions like Kell v Canada3 show that realisation of intersectionality lies in 
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the recounting of the specific patterns of disadvantage suffered by intersectional claimants, 
which are unique in terms of their ‘combined’4 effect explained in terms of both patterns of 
group disadvantage shared by women generally but also different in terms of their specific 
intersectional position. Thus, pointing out the patterns of group disadvantage alone without 
showing this dynamic of sameness and difference does little more than underscore that every 
discrimination case is unique. Without an explanation of such kind, even the best of 
intersectionality-friendly decisions will actually make little difference analytically.5 Sure 
enough, there may still be a tangible difference in terms of what remedies intersectional 
claimants end up accessing, but ultimately, we hope for the reasoning to be robust enough to 
be significant guidance in how we deploy intersectionality as a method and as a theory, and 
not simply a tool for activating a certain result in a case.  
 
It is not until chapter 6 that we get a substantial consideration of violence against women in 
terms of what it actually is. This then is also the most illuminating part of the book. The aim is 
to elaborate what an intersectional approach adds to the examination of position of Romani 
women in Europe, theoretically and methodologically (p. 174). Sosa presents her observations 
from a range of interactions with survivors, service providers and representatives of 
associations working with Romani women. She spells out the differences in perceptions of 
gender, ethnicity, religion and socio-economic class in Romani women’s experiences of 
intimate partner violence. Inspite of these differences, Romani women hardly seek out the 
specialised services either within or beyond their communities to help deal with intimate 
partner violence. It seems that the main difference the difference makes is that Romani women 
are basically left without much support despite the services available to them in principle. 
However, not all services are attuned to these differences or to intersectionality. Sosa argues 
that an appreciation of differences is in fact seen as antithetic to the principle of equality in the 
Spanish Constitution (p. 199). Formal equality thus comes in the way of actually addressing 
Romani women’s experiences of violence. Sosa repeats this empirical study from the 
perspective of indigenous and migrant women in Argentina. She comes to a similar conclusion, 
that although differences of indigenous and migrant status make a difference to a survivor’s 
experience of intimate partner violence, these are generally disregarded as causally relevant 
to it and are in fact used to ‘naturalise’ or justify it (p. 237). This of course, is regardless of the 
commitment to equality and a strong conviction that domestic violence is universal and cuts 
across class, race and ethnicity (ibid). 
 
I would have hoped for an early word on what forms of violence against women really look like. 
A pithy example of intersectional gender violence would have bridged the gap between law 
and reality and would have elevated the legal cause of this book. After all, so much detail about 
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the law on gender-based violence matters only when it speaks to/in not just the legalese, 
including the language in which gender-based violence is spoken of on an international plane, 
but to the lived realities of it. Law must respond to that, not its own version of what we as 
lawyers call violence against women or gender-based violence. The constant reckoning of 
reality above law is what defined Black women’s contribution to intersectionality. If we take 
cue from the roots of intersectionality theory which lie in critical race feminism, we will see 
that intersectionality cannot be so neatly separated in terms of its theory and praxis, and we 
would be left to do it as one. So, I wish that Sosa’s important empirical work had spilled over 
some of the more clinical examination of law on gender violence and intersectionality.  
 
Ultimately, the book leaves us with a sense that the legal landscape is rife with 
intersectionality-related norms which may or may not be employed in an intersectionality-
friendly way. What the book shows us is then the landscape of norms, resisting the conclusion 
that intersectionality has already been or can easily be translated into law, and in this case, of 
gender-based violence, following a one-size-fits-all model (p. 264). That, I think, is a significant 
contribution this book makes to the field of intersectionality and human rights law, which by 
no means is a small accomplishment.  
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